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FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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v. ] 
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REPLY BRIEF OP APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. YAZZIE'S ISSUE WAS 
SUFFICIENTLY PRESERVED 
The State makes a bold statement indicating that Yazzie 
has failed to preserve his "arguments" and that this Court 
should thus not consider them. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 
9-10. Ironically, the State fails to support this argument 
and, in the next sentence claims that Yazzie7s arguments lack 
legal and factual support. Id. As argued further below, 
Yazzie properly preserved the issue of lack of reasonable 
suspicion by the filing and arguing of the motion to suppress 
before the trial court. 
Specifically, the State argues that Yazzie "expand[ed] 
his argument" on appeal. See, Brief of Appellee at p. 9. The 
State takes issue, arguing that Yazzie claims for the first 
time (a) "...that Halliday's prior knowledge of defendant 
could not be considered because it was based on a ^mistaken 
assumption' that defendant was never licensed in any 
jurisdiction;" and (b) "...that a defendant's criminal history 
alone can never establish a reasonable suspicion." Id* 
Although the State has failed to support their preservation 
argument with any legal analysis, Yazzie will show how the 
issues were adequately preserved. 
The State apparently misunderstands the preservation 
requirement. The first of the State's issues here is again a 
product of their misconstrued notions respecting Yazzie's 
arguments. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by 
the court without a jury, a question to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a finding may be made on appeal whether or 
not an objection to the finding was made in the trial court. 
See, State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, 19 fn. 4, 999 P.2d 
1252. Even a cursory reading of Yazzie's brief shows that 
Yazzie attacks the trial court's oral finding as not 
conforming to the evidence and relied upon in the trial 
court's denial of the motion to suppress at issue herein. 
See, Brief of Appellant at pp. 15-17, Argument "C" entitled 
"The Facts Do Not Support the Finding That Yazzie Had Not Had 
2 
a License for a Long Time." Thus, Yazzie's issue here was 
adequately preserved to the extent that it needed to be. 
. The second of the State's issues here ignores Yazzie's 
entire argument before the trial court. Yazzie's argument 
before the trial court focused completely on the fact that 
Halliday did not have reasonable suspicion to pull Yazzie over 
when he did so solely based on his knowledge of Yazzie's 
criminal history. Testimony was specifically elicited for 
this purpose and this issue is argued throughout the 
suppression hearing. Yazzie's issue here was more than 
adequately preserved. 
II. HALLIDAY DID NOT HAVE 
THE REQUISITE REASONABLE 
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION 
A. The State Misconstrues Yazzie's Argument. 
The State1 argues in its brief that "[b]elow, defendant 
conceded that if the last encounter had been more recent, the 
facts could support reasonable suspicion." See, Brief of 
Appellee at p. 8. In support of their contention, they cite 
to Appellant counsel's argument at the hearing on the Motion, 
stating "[P]erhaps had the officer stopped him, like in the 
1
 Capitalized terms not specifically defined herein are 
afforded the same meaning as given them in Appellant's 
opening brief in this matter. 
3 
last couple of week[s] of the last - certainly the day before 
or certainly five minutes before, and found out the [sic2] 
Mr., ah, Yazzie didn't have a driver's license, than [sic3] 
maybe he could have more of a - of an articulable suspicion." 
As is obvious by the quote itself, Appellant counsel made no 
such concession. 
, What Appellant counsel indicated at the hearing on the 
Motion was that, had Halliday recently pulled Yazzie over 
"...AND found out that Mr. . .Yazzie didn't have a driver's 
license..." then Halliday could have had more of an 
articulable suspicion. R58 at p. 24 (emphasis added). 
Obviously if an officer was just recently apprized within the 
last couple of weeks—through an encounter—that a certain 
individual did not have a driver's license, and then that 
individual was again seen driving soon thereafter, those facts 
would rise to a level of articulable suspicion since it would 
take time to obtain a license after just being cited for 
driving without one. Such is not the fact scenario here, 
however, as pointed out by Appellant counsel in that same 
2
 The error is contained in the quotation of the Brief 
of Appellee at p. 8 fn. 5, but is not contained in the 
original at R58 p. 24. 
3
 See footnote 2 above. 
4 
argument. Hence, the State's brief misconstrues the argument 
made by counsel at the hearing on the Motion. 
Bw The State Misstates Halliday's Testimony. 
The State argues that "[i]ri sum, Chief Halliday7 s 
knowledge—that for twenty years and in over one hundred 
encounters, defendant never produced a license and was never 
seen driving—supports a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
defendant was driving illegally on October 15, 2003." Brief of 
Appellee at p. 12. This argument misstates Halliday's 
testimony at the hearing on the Motion. 
Halliday testified that his department, not Halliday 
personally, had over a hundred encounters with Yazzie. R058 
at pp. 8-9. Halliday testified that, in only ten (10) non-
traffic personal encounters he had with Yazzie, Yazzie had not 
produced a driver's license; however, Halliday testified that 
he had never specifically asked for a driver's license. Id. 
at pp. 7, 16-17. Halliday testified that he personally had 
never seen Yazzie driving, not that Yazzie had never been seen 
driving at all. Id. at pp. 6, 15. 
It is clear that the State attempts to use these 
misstatements as support for their otherwise unavailing 
argument. However, the record is clear on these areas, which 
5 
are supportive of the fact that no reasonable suspicion 
existed in this case. 
C. The State Misunderstands the Issue. 
Together with those areas argued supra, the State seems 
to misunderstand the issue altogether. As set forth in their 
brief, the State believes that "...the issue is not whether 
defendant ever had a Utah license, but whether he was driving 
illegally on October 15, 2003, when observed by Chief 
Halliday..." See, Brief of Appellee at p. 10. We agree that 
the underlying issue here is not whether Yazzie ever had a 
Utah license; however, this information is a factor in the 
determination as to the actual issue4, which is not whether 
Yazzie was driving illegally, but whether Halliday had 
reasonable suspicion to believe he was. Unfortunately for the 
State, their reliance upon their misunderstanding causes their 
argument to fail, as shown below. 
(1) The Fruits Do Not Justify the Poisonous Tree. 
A police officer who conducts an investigatory stop must 
be able to articulate what it is about those facts he or she 
4
 As previously mentioned supra, and as argued in the 
opening brief, the trial court also believed this was a 
factor since it erroneously relied upon its oral finding 
that "...it was such a long time that the defendant had 
never had a license/' R058 at p. 28. 
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observes which leads to inference of criminal activity; if 
officer fails or is unable to do so, his or her suspicion is 
classified as mere "hunch" rather than articulable suspicion. 
State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1990) . This Court has 
long held that it will not condone unconstitutional police 
conduct simply because it yields favorable results. State v. 
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). This Court has 
especially voiced its concern pertaining to unconstitutional 
police conduct that appears to be common practice, yielding a 
significant number of individuals who have been subjected to 
this conduct. Id. at fn. 2. 
The State's brief argues that, because Halliday's hunch 
was correct, the stop was reasonable. See Brief of Appellee 
at p. 10 (indicating issue is whether Yazzie was driving 
illegally on October 15, 2003); at pp. 10-11 (indicating that 
the chief "correctly suspected that defendant was not 
licensed"); at p. 10 (indicating that M[w]hy he was not 
licensed is irrelevant"). As detailed in Yazzie's opening 
brief, Halliday's conduct was unconstitutional in that it 
lacked reasonable suspicion. See, Brief of Appellant at pp. 
17-23. As more thoroughly discussed below, Halliday's 
7 
"hunch"was still merely a hunch, however, and not capable of 
rising to a level of articulable suspicion. See, Godina-Luna. 
(2) Knowledge of Criminal History Alone Does Not 
Rise to Reasonable Suspicion, 
The State argues that Yazzie is incorrect that "...a 
knowledge of a defendant's criminal history may never be 
considered in determining a reasonable suspicion." See, Brief 
of Appellee at p. 11. First, the State cites to page 20 of 
Yazzie's brief, which specifically contains the actual 
argument that "...prior criminal involvement alone is 
insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion." Brief of 
Appellant at p. 20 (emphasis added) citing U.S. v. Sandoval, 
29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir. 1994). The Utah Court of Appeals 
has adopted this holding as well. See, State v. Humphrey/ 937 
P.2d 137, 143 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that fact that 
individual previously has been involved in criminal activity, 
alone, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for 
stop). 
While it is true that knowledge of a defendant's criminal 
history may be considered as a factor in determining the 
totality of the circumstances, see Humphrey at 143, the State 
has not argued any other factors to be considered. The State 
8 
attempts to set forth other factors, but when taken 
individually or on the whole, they each pertain only to 
Yazzie's criminal history. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 7-8. 
Halliday testified that his twenty year knowledge of Yazzie is 
based only upon law enforcement encounters. R058 at p. 8. 
Halliday's knowledge that Yazzie claimed Utah residency is 
irrelevant to the issue before this Court, however, it also is 
based only upon prior law enforcement encounters. Id. at p. 
6. The fact that Halliday had never seen Yazzie driving a 
vehicle only supports Yazzie's argument that Halliday did not 
have any prior traffic encounters or the knowledge of any 
traffic encounters with Yazzie. Id. The State's remaining 
factors specifically pertain to Yazzie's criminal history: 
Halliday was personally aware of "well over one hundred police 
encounters of defendant by local police;" Halliday personally 
asked Yazzie for identification more than ten times; 
Halliday's last encounter with Yazzie was approximately one 
year prior to the encounter at issue; and during all prior 
encounters with Halliday, Yazzie never produced a driver's 
license. Brief of Appellee at pp. 7-8. 
The States fails to set forth any other factor because 
nothing more was elicited or testified to before the trial 
9 
court since no other factors exist in this matter. Halliday 
pulled Yazzie over based solely on the knowledge of Yazzie's 
criminal history. Absent any other factor to be considered, 
Yazzie's criminal history alone is insufficient for a showing 
of reasonableness in this matter. Humphrey at 143; Sandoval 
at 542. 
(3) Halliday Should Have Contacted Dispatch. 
Without a reasonable articulable suspicion, Halliday 
should have contacted dispatch to confirm or dispel his hunch 
that Yazzie was driving without a valid license. See, United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-687, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575-
1576, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)(discussing factors courts should 
consider in determining "whether the police diligently pursued 
a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel 
their suspicions quickly."). The trial court agreed with this 
contention in its oral findings where it stated that it wished 
Halliday would have called dispatch or waited until Yazzie 
committed a traffic violation so the case could be a "no-
brainer." R058 at pp. 22, 28-29. The State concedes in its 
brief that if reasonable suspicion is lacking, Halliday 
"...would have been required to contact dispatch to determine 
10 
the license status before stopping defendant." See, Brief of 
Appellee at p. 8 fn. 6. 
It is clear that reasonable suspicion was lacking in this 
case and that the prosecutor and the trial court relied 
completely on Yazzie's criminal history to determine that the 
stop was justified. It is clear that Halliday should have 
contacted dispatch and it is concerning that this case 
represents his standard practice in these circumstances. R058 
at p. 14. This Court should overturn Yazzie's conviction and 
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Yazzie respectfully 
requests that this Court overturn the trial court's Judgment, 
reverse the trial court's denial of Yazzie's motion to 
suppress, and order such other relief as it deems necessary. 
DATED this 24th day of January, 2005. 
William L. Schultz 
Counsel for Appellant 
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